Potential problems with industry-supported clinical research  by Rutherford, Robert B. & Johnston, K.Wayne
Device manufacturers and pharmaceutical com-
panies are a significant source of research funding for
clinicians in all specialties. Industry-clinician rela-
tionships may provide important professional and
financial opportunities, but they may also jeopardize
not only the investigators’ scientific integrity, but
also their primary responsibility to patient rights and
safety.
In this editorial, we review some important issues
raised by industry-supported clinical research,
including the control by industry of the clinical trial
and the data; discuss problems that may arise in the
relationship between clinicians and industry; illus-
trate some of the dilemmas with some recent exam-
ples; and make suggestions that may avert potential
problems. Our suggestions appear in italic type.
Most young clinicians consider themselves fortu-
nate when they obtain funding from industry to
carry out research to support their academic devel-
opment. They recognize that such corporate-funded
clinical research is generally less demanding than
peer-reviewed funding because the company usually
supplies the research protocols, prototype institu-
tional review board (IRB) applications, and patient
consent forms. Funding allows the investigator to
hire research associates to collect and report the
patient data. In many multicenter trials, the compa-
ny analyzes the data centrally. Despite these and
other advantages from industry-supported research,
there are also some risks, and not all are obvious to
the potential investigator—particularly, the control
of scientific data by the industry sponsor.
In a research study, both the investigator and the
company share the objective that the new technolo-
gy (typically a device or drug) will significantly
improve our ability to diagnose disease or treat
patients. Both hope and expect that the joint ven-
ture will reflect well on themselves and their institu-
tions. However, the company and the investigator
have additional, but differing, objectives in the same
research project, and these may come into conflict.
In funding the research, the company also has the
underlying objective to maintain or increase profit for
shareholders and employees. In return for their
investment in a research project, the company can rea-
sonably expect protection of its commercially valuable
intellectual property, and, not unsurprisingly, contrac-
tual agreements will reflect this. Because profit will, in
part, depend on a short time-to-market, the company
will be eager to obtain regulatory approval and pub-
lish positive results as quickly as possible. The investi-
gator may be concerned that steps in the usual scien-
tific process are being circumvented.
Physicians have a primary duty to ensure ethical
patient care and patient safety.1 While performing
research, their primary goal should be the acquisi-
tion of knowledge for the general good of patients.
In pursuing these particular goals, the researcher must
have ready access to the data, verify the results and
their analysis, and report those results in a timely and
accurate fashion. The company also has responsibili-
ties in regard to patient safety, but in the analysis and
reporting of results, a conflict with the company’s
financial, marketing, and proprietary interests may
arise.
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Although a research agreement between a com-
pany and an individual investigator may appear
straightforward, it is nevertheless part of a complex
interaction that also involves patients, IRBs, coinves-
tigators, the university, the clinical division/depart-
ment chiefs, the hospital administration, the scientif-
ic community, and the regulatory body to which the
company is responsible (Figure). With submission of
the results of a trial for publication, this interaction
also involves scientific journals, their editors and
reviewers, and finally, the readers.
Consideration of patient rights and safety is
dominant. Approval of the contract between a com-
pany and an individual investigator requires adher-
ence to the policies of the hospital and university
and their approval of the content of the contract.
The institution will want assurance that the investi-
gator does not enter into a contract that raises a sig-
nificant conflict of interest or conflict of commit-
ment with the investigator’s hospital or university
activities. The IRB must approve the ethics of the
study and monitor it. During the study, the investi-
gator should reassure the IRB, the clinical
division/department chief, and the hospital adminis-
tration and university of the continued safety of the
study. This requires reassurance by an independent
data-monitoring committee that the results support
the continuation of the study. However, problems
may arise if the data-monitoring committee is inap-
propriately constituted and ineffective or if the
company analyzes the data and determines what is
released to the investigators.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The following discussion presents some of the
problems that may arise in corporate-sponsored clin-
ical investigations. It is organized in order of the
chronology of events that occur during the course of
a study, not in order of perceived importance. 
Financial conflict of interest
After publication of the first study of the efficacy
of tissue-type plasminogen activator, it was reported
that several of the investigators owned stock in the
sponsoring company.2 Concerning this, the follow-
ing is recommended by the American Medical
Association: “in order to avoid criticism that the
decisions an investigator makes during the study
might have been biased by financial conflict of inter-
est and the concern that the validity of the scientific
data may have been jeopardized, the investigator
should not hold stock or stock options in the spon-
Complex interactions in relationship between industry and an investigator.
soring company or be an officer of the company.”3
Investments in mutual funds that are managed by
others may be overlooked, but all known holdings in
the company, including those by close family mem-
bers or practice partners, should be declared to alert
the readers of potential competition of interest.
Although the above recommendation warns
against stockholding by the investigator, a company
may offer stock after completion of the research, in
recognition of contributions to the development or
testing of a device or drug. This is not wrong, as
long as it is not by prior tacit agreement, but failure
to disclose this when research is presented or pub-
lished is inappropriate and has led to increasing pub-
lic criticism, as exemplified by the recent media cov-
erage of the Heart Port device and coronary
stents.4,5
Nondisclosure agreements
Nondisclosure agreements protect the company
against the investigators divulging proprietary infor-
mation and thereby devaluing the product.
Investigators appreciate the need of the company to
protect proprietary information, but they may not
fully comprehend the legal verbiage or the legal
implications in the nondisclosure agreements that
they are asked to sign. Such agreements are usually
drawn up by the company’s lawyers to protect their
client’s proprietary interests, and only occasionally
are the investigators’ rights addressed as well. In
addition, the agreement may not give the consultant
or the investigator appropriate credit or reward for
innovative ideas or constructive advice, which may
have significantly improved the ultimate design of a
device or determined the success of a trial.
The research contract
The contract to perform a research study in col-
laboration with industry may be complex. Few
investigators ask a lawyer to review the contract the
company asks them to sign. They do not want to
appear to be looking a gift horse in the mouth; how-
ever, knowing that it may be a one-sided agreement,
one should read over all contracts and pay particular
attention to certain details (eg, be sure that the inves-
tigator has access to the data and that the right to pub-
lish important aspects [with co-investigators] is not
inappropriately restricted by the agreement). Clauses
in the contract dealing with publication rights, confi-
dentiality, intellectual property, access to data, and
conflict resolution, in particular, should be carefully
reviewed by the institution as well as by the investiga-
tor, to ensure patient safety through prompt access to
data and to guard the scientific freedom of the inves-
tigator.
The Olivieri case at the Hospital for Sick
Children in Toronto illustrates the complexity of this
problem. The following paragraph was included in
the contract of a drug study6:
Contract provides that all information whether written
or not, obtained or generated by you during the term of
the LA-02 Contract and for a period of three years here-
after, shall be and remain secret and confidential and shall
not be disclosed in any manner to any third party except
with the prior written consent of Apotex. Please be aware
that Apotex will take all possible steps to ensure that these
obligations of confidentiality are met and will vigorously
pursue all legal remedies in the event that there is any
breach of these obligations.
—Excerpt from a letter dated May 24, 1996, from Dr
Michael Spino, vice president of Scientific Affairs, Apotex
Research Inc, to Dr Nancy Olivieri.
During the study of the drug deferiprone for the
treatment of iron overload in patients with thal-
assemia major, Dr Olivieri became concerned that
the drug lost effectiveness with long-term use and
suspected that it might worsen hepatic fibrosis.
When these safety concerns were reported to the
hospital’s research ethics board, she was instructed
to change the wording of the informed consent.
When informed of the change, Apotex terminated
the drug trial in Toronto. When it was determined
that the data of others reflected similar observations,
Dr Olivieri and her colleagues, in the face of threat-
ened legal action from Apotex, published the con-
troversial findings in the New England Journal of
Medicine.7 Although not a vascular example, this
study is cited because it raised important issues with-
in the scientific community related to contracts with
companies that are signed by an individual
researcher, and the researcher’s hospital research
institute, hospital administration, hospital institution
review boards, and university. It also illustrates the
importance of institutional policies and procedures
that define the responsibilities for scrutinizing a 
contract.
Ideally, individual researchers should seek expert
advice before making a commitment that may be
inappropriate. It would be of great help if societies col-
laborated to obtain legal advice in drawing up a gener-
ic confidentiality document and contract. In doing so,
it would be valuable to identify the items that should be
included in research contracts—items that would be
viewed as fair and standard practice and would protect
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the rights of scientific investigators, patients, and insti-
tutions, as well as the sponsoring company. In particu-
lar, it is important to define the right to have access to
data and present and publish the data in a timely fash-
ion, regardless of the results of the study. 
An exemplary relationship between industry and
investigators is illustrated in a recent publication on
the economic analysis of low-dose heparin versus the
low-molecular-weight heparin enoxaparin.8 Under
the heading of “funding” the following statement
was made:
Unrestricted funding for this analysis was provided in
part by Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer (Quebec, Quebec), the
manufacturer of enoxaparin. The terms of the contract
with the company were determined at the outset after we
proposed the study design and methods, including mea-
surement, modeling, and analytical strategies. We retained
the rights to control entirely the methods and conclusions
throughout the study and to publish or otherwise dissem-
inate the results of the study and their conclusions regard-
less of outcome. The company received a copy of the
report and manuscript before publication but was specifi-
cally precluded from influencing us at any stage after the
contract was signed.
As will be seen below, the ability of investigators
to make statements such as this, according to their
research contract, is far too uncommon.
Addressing these issues at the outset and having
them addressed in the contract in a manner that is
fair to both the company and the investigator can
avert significant problems later.
Development of research protocols 
In carrying out a clinical trial, the investigator
has the ethical responsibility to ensure that the
design and execution of the study protect the
patient’s rights. The investigator has a responsibility
as a scientist to see that it is properly designed so as
to produce meaningful data to answer the question
posed by the trial. Having a research protocol
already drawn up by the sponsoring company is con-
venient and can serve as a useful starting place for
discussions between the sponsor and the potential
collaborating investigators; however, investigators
should not simply accept the drafted protocol. They
should take an active role in improving the design of
the trial.
Conflicts may arise if the investigator recom-
mends changes in the company’s original protocol
(eg, because it lacks objective enough end points,
has too favorable exclusion and inclusion criteria,
lacks appropriate controls or uses comparison with
historical controls, does not account for treatment
crossovers or does not analyze their impact on out-
come judged solely on an intent to treat basis, has
too short a follow up, or fails to include a cost analy-
sis and quality-of-life assessment). The investigator
should oppose any aspects of the trial that might
hinder determination of conclusive and meaningful
results, or might produce results that can be gener-
alized or will be accepted by one’s peers.
Conflict may also arise because the company’s
underlying goal may only be to prove “safety and
efficacy” in the broadest terms and take the quickest
route to gaining regulatory approval, rather than to
compare the treatment with current competitive
approaches. Depending on whether their back-
ground is primarily in marketing or in research and
development, those responsible for the company’s
sponsorship of a clinical trial may be more comfort-
able with simply achieving recognition of safety and
efficacy than with attempting a comparison with an
alternative treatment. Once approved by the regula-
tory agencies, marketing strategies rather than risking
scientific comparisons may be used to pursue advan-
tages over competitive treatments. The investigator
should take the responsibility to help ensure proper strat-
ification, comparable study groups, accurate power esti-
mates, definitions of what constitutes a reportable com-
plication, and gathering and analyzing the data in a
format that is compatible with standardized reporting
practices. Even though some companies hire experi-
enced trialists as consultants, investigators involved in
the study are more likely to have detailed knowledge
of the key clinical issues involved. 
Comparative groups: inclusion and exclusion
criteria. The outcome of a trial and its generalizabil-
ity are greatly influenced by the inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria. In the early studies of endografts
designed for abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA)
repair, inclusion of only cases with favorable anatomy
is a cautious approach and furthers one of the com-
pany’s goals of demonstrating safety and successful
deployment, but the results cannot be generalized to
most patient with an AAA. Liberal inclusion criteria
can have the same effect; examples include trials of
laser and atherectomy devices, and stent studies that
included patients with lesions that would have yield-
ed good results with PTA alone, and trials of endo-
grafts for occlusive lesions for which good results
have been established for PTA and stenting. After
initial studies that demonstrate safety, each new
advance in technology (and cost) should be tried on the
marginal lesions that the simpler technology cannot sat-
isfactorily address.
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Blinding and randomization. Blinding and
randomization in prospective trials are obviously
desirable but not always possible. Blinding is not fea-
sible when the compared treatments are perceptibly
different; unfortunately, this opens the door not
only to investigator bias, but also to patient bias. In
some of the AAA endograft trials, patients random-
ized to surgery backed out and went to another par-
ticipating institution for another roll of the dice.
Randomization may also present a problem if the
individual investigator concludes that one treatment
is clearly preferable. This raises the question, should
that individual participate in the trial or continue
entering patients? Freedman9 addressed this ethical
challenge in clinical research by suggesting that clin-
ical equipoise (ie, uncertainty) exists if the informed
professional group (not an individual) has not
reached a consensus and that it is ethical for the indi-
vidual to enter patients into a trial that will give a
definite answer to the question at hand. Recent
debates over clinical trials on carotid angioplasty
have repeatedly raised the issue of clinical
equipoise.10,11
It is important that the mechanism for random-
ization be predefined and independent of investiga-
tor and sponsor input. Further, validation of the suit-
ability of the patient for inclusion in the trial must be
efficient, and not too complex or time-consuming, so
that the process does not interfere with recruiting a
broad spectrum of cases. In trials of thrombolytic
agents for acute arterial occlusion, those with acute
limb-threatening ischemia were grossly underrepre-
sented, in part because of the complexity of the study
design and the time consumed by the randomization
process.12 Another contributor to this was a natural
selection bias in the group with acute ischemia
because the treating physician could exclude a patient
from randomization if the physician thought that
patient safety was at risk.
End points. The choice of end points of a trial
is critical. What end point constitutes evidence of
efficacy of treatment? Under what conditions will
the trial be stopped? Some end points are desirable
but unrealistic. In pharmacotherapy trials for critical
limb ischemia, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has insisted that the primary end points
include salvaging limbs and saving lives rather than
using the useful and potentially achievable clinical
goals of relieving rest pain and healing ischemic
ulcers. This may have resulted in falsely negative
studies. Similarly, in the case of the thrombolytic tri-
als, restoring graft or artery patency for a reasonable
period would be a more realistic end point, consid-
ering that the treatment of the underlying lesions,
not the method of clot removal, determines long-
term outcome. This too has contributed to negative
results of trials.
Combining end points may add strength to the
statistical analysis, decrease the number of cases
required, and save costs, but this approach may
reduce the generalizability. In the STILE trial,12
four clinical end points were combined into one
clinical outcome, resulting in the premature stop-
ping of the trial when two less important end points,
major morbidity and ongoing ischemia, created a
statistically significant difference in combined clini-
cal outcome in favor of surgery, at a time when the
more important end points of mortality and ampu-
tation were not significantly different. Again, the
result was a negative trial for the tested therapy.
The appropriate selection of objective end points
is essential but does not solve the problem of a trial
that does not have a proper comparative control
group. This is particularly true of treatments for
severe limb ischemia, because patients may improve
spontaneously with time rather than as the result of
treatment (eg, sympathectomy, use of hyperbaric
oxygen, spinal cord stimulation, and, up until now,
VEGF).
Cost considerations
It is reasonable for a sponsoring company to aim
to obtain scientifically valid data to support regula-
tory approval and the introduction of their product
into the medical market place and to expect the
study to be carried out in a time-efficient manner
and at reasonable cost. The investigator and the host
institution can reasonably expect fair compensation
for their participation. Attempts to limit the expen-
diture on a clinical study may compromise the qual-
ity of the data. In discussions with company represen-
tatives over the design of a research trial protocol, one
should be wary if the company is unwilling to modify
the protocol (eg, the number of patients recruited or the
duration of follow-up) because of cost considerations.
This is a warning sign that you may be dealing with
a company whose resources are too limited to sup-
port a proper study or one that places its financial
interests above scientific investigation.
In being reimbursed for running a clinical trial,
the investigator faces a potential conflict of inter-
est—specifically, the conflict between (1) ensuring
that the individual patient’s rights to receive the
most appropriate medical care are guaranteed and
(2) the investigator’s self-interest in obtaining reim-
bursement for entering patients into the study and
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other benefits that might accrue to the investigator
from participating in the study.13 Clinicians should
expect to be reimbursed fairly for their time spent
managing the patients and the project, the salaries of
study coordinators and fellows, and the overhead
and miscellaneous expenses. The American Medical
Association recommends that remuneration of the
investigator should be commensurate with the
efforts and that funds should be administered by the
institution that pays the direct and indirect costs.
However, it seems reasonable that unforeseen “prof-
it” could be used to assist funding other research or
educational programs or trainees. Most institutions
have mechanisms to prevent faculty from personally
receiving the excess money generated from a
research study; however, policies on the use of the
profit for academic purposes are often vague. The
IRB should be informed of funding agreements, and it
should be disclosed whether the investigator has any
other relationship with the sponsoring company, such as
stockholder, corporate officer, or paid consultant.
However, disclosure alone is not a remedy; IRBs
need to develop recommendations for understand-
ing and managing the conflict so that patients’ rights
are protected.
Institutional Review Board approval
The IRB must ensure that the study design is sci-
entifically valid; approve the ethics of the study to
ensure that patients are properly enlisted, receive
appropriate informed consent, have a low risk-bene-
fit ratio if enrolled in the study, and are not subject-
ed to unnecessary procedures; and be sure that the
financial arrangements are appropriate. In addition,
the IRB should be in a position to monitor the study
as it progresses. To safeguard patient care, the inves-
tigator must have reports from the data-monitoring
committee to be able to communicate the results of the
safety of continuing the study to the IRB on a regular
basis. To fulfill its obligations, the IRB must be inde-
pendent of the sponsor, investigator, and institution. 
Data collection, analysis, and control of data:
data monitoring committee
If the company controls the data and does not
provide frequent reports, including complications,
the investigators may not be able to fulfill their eth-
ical and moral obligation to the patients and their
responsibilities to the IRB and institutions. Interim
evaluation of the data is important to detect unex-
pected complication, low accrual rates, protocol vio-
lations, incomplete follow-up, and other problems
to ensure safety (because analysis of a clinical trial is
a dynamic process). An appropriately constituted
data-monitoring committee is the optimum method to
protect the patients’ interests by disclosing unexpected
complications, ensuring that there are no serious
methodologic deficiencies that would prevent the study
from meeting the scientific objectives, and determin-
ing whether the end point of the study, be it positive or
negative, has been reached. Explicit “stopping rules”
should be defined. The committee should include
experienced investigators, statisticians, and company
representatives. Expert statistical advice is necessary
because false conclusions may be drawn from an
apparent statistically significant difference early in the
study, when the number of patients entered is low. 
On occasion, “leaks” of results have changed the
investigators’ pattern of recruiting or excluding sub-
jects for a trial and consequently affected the final
outcome. For this problem to be prevented until the
study is complete or stopped, the end point results
must be available to the data-monitoring committee
but not to the individual investigators.
Data analysis. Unfortunately, it has become
increasingly apparent that some presenters and pri-
mary authors of manuscripts at our national and
regional meetings have reviewed only the summa-
rized analysis of the data that was supplied by the
company. They have not reviewed the raw data or
performed or checked the statistical analyses and
cannot supply the additional information requested
by discussants or reviewers.
For proprietary reasons, device manufacturers
and pharmaceutical companies rarely release the
results of their own “in-house” research; there is also
a perception that they may be selective about the
data from clinical studies that they choose to release
to their clinical investigators to make public.
Although the company and its consultants are not
likely to try to hide unfavorable data, by not releas-
ing all the data to the investigators for analysis, there
is the risk that significant relationships in the data set
are not analyzed. Thus, the use of summary data pro-
vided by company officials can lead to problems.
There are many examples of the control of trial
data by industry. The often-quoted European ran-
domized prospective trial in which the benefit of pri-
mary stenting, with Palmaz stent, was compared
with iliac percutaneous transluminal balloon angio-
plasty (PTA) alone, completed many years ago, is
one example. The results, claiming statistically sig-
nificant advantages for primary stenting in both
“clinical success” and secondary patency at 5 years,
were presented at several meetings and in abstract
form in 1993,14 but the study has not yet been pub-
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lished as a peer-reviewed article. It is regrettable that
the principal authors and the company have not per-
sisted in achieving publication by providing the nec-
essary data to satisfy peer review. Approval by the
FDA has been obtained for this indication, and it is
presumed that this study was among the data pre-
sented. With regulatory approval and marketing suc-
cess achieved, the scientific aim of the study seems to
have taken a backseat.
Recently, summary data were the sole basis for
two abstracts submitted to major vascular societies.
This is a risky but not uncommon practice. One
paper had to be withdrawn from the 1998 American
Venous Forum meeting because the company that
sponsored the study did not reply to repeated
requests to supply the necessary background infor-
mation (the denominators) to put the study’s find-
ings in proper perspective in sufficient time to allow
presentation.15 When the actual data were ultimate-
ly obtained, they did not match the summary data
originally submitted to the investigators for prepara-
tion of the abstract. In presenting and publishing a
recent analysis of the cost-effectiveness of an aortic
endograft device,16 the authors were accused of not
having data to support their direct cost analysis.
Although an inquiry subsequently demonstrated
that a company consultant had raw data from most
of the individual centers and had supplied the
authors with summary data on which to base their
projections, nonetheless, they were vulnerable to the
criticism of using summarized data rather than ana-
lyzing the raw data themselves.
Finally when the results of a trial depend signifi-
cantly on the interpretation of diagnostic studies,
arrangements should be made for these studies to be
independently interpreted by blinded individuals (eg,
those in a core laboratory who have no vested interest in
the outcome and are independent of company or inves-
tigator interference). 
Interim data release. With nonrandomized stud-
ies of new devices, preliminary interval reports of the
progress of the trial are possible and may even be
desirable. Unfortunately, many of the early reports
contain soft data and are often presented with enthu-
siastic bias. At the beginning of such a study, during
the active patient-recruitment phase, results can often
be obtained from investigators’ meetings, and the
participants may be allowed (if not encouraged) to
present the data at meetings and symposia. In the case
of the evaluation of the Endovascular Technologies
(EVT) device, restrictions were subsequently placed
on the presentation of data released at investigators’
meetings. It was announced that, because of the need
for compliance with “inside trader rules” when the
company “went public,” official data updates would
only be released by the company. Such data disclo-
sures took the form of periodic press releases, seem-
ingly intended more for investors than for clinical
investigators. A more appropriate reason for a compa-
ny not releasing data during the course of a trial is the
desire to avoid having to retract impressions from pre-
liminary analyses, and rather wait for full analysis on
completion of one of the phases of the trial. This has
been the explanation given for the Gore Excluder
Trial. Other companies have been willing to release
their device data from the Eurostar registry, but
increasingly companies are wary of releasing interim
data from ongoing FDA trials and will generally des-
ignate one of the principal investigators to present
updates at well-intended vascular symposia. Such
updates of data are rarely critical and often present
summarized data supplied by the company. This
deprives the vascular surgical community, who mostly
attend a limited number of meetings, of objective
updates of trials that could help in patient manage-
ment decisions (eg, open AAA repair vs referral to an
endograft trial and, if so, which one). This dilemma
could be avoided because in a properly constructed
prospective device evaluation, the data are collected in a
way that will be suitable for submission to the FDA and
for publication; consequently, there is no reason why
interim data releases, such as presentations at symposia,
should not contain objective data and be reported by
using standard reporting practices. The details of the
device and its use are proprietary; objective data from a
clinical trial into which patients are still being actually
recruited should not be. One of the main reasons for
regular objective and complete disclosure of the out-
comes of new devices is the need to assess the failure
rate and complications, particularly significant adverse
events. Even periodic investigators’ meetings may not
fulfill this need when the data are prepared and pre-
sented by company officials or the investigators are
instructed not to disseminate the information.
Presentation and publication of data
Adverse events. Significant delays may occur
between the initial discovery of device-specific prob-
lems and their eventual dissemination at meetings or
in published reports. Reports of serious complications
should be circulated immediately by the company to all
investigators, who then have a responsibility to notify
their patients, institution, and the IRB. In a recent
editorial, one of the authors of this editorial17
emphasized the importance of promptly disseminat-
ing information if a problem is noted that potential-
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ly reflects on the design or deployment of the device.
When hook fractures occurred with the EVT device,
the problem was quickly disclosed.18 However,
when fabrication flaws were detected in another
commonly used device, the Min Tec Stentor graft, it
was some time before there was public acknowledg-
ment at meetings or in publications,19 although one
heard of “disappearing (breaking) sutures” from dis-
cussions at investigators’ meetings. In an analysis of
the Eurostar data20 it was reported that “breakage of
polypropylene sutures connecting the rings of the
metal stent frame has recently been observed in one
of the commercially available types of endografts,”
but the device was not identified by name. Several
important issues are raised by these adverse events:
Is it the company’s or the principal investigator’s
responsibility to disseminate information about
adverse events? Who should receive such informa-
tion—only potential device implanters or the vascu-
lar community? What is the appropriate middle
ground between premature allegations of device fail-
ures and delayed disclosure? And is it appropriate to
accede to company requests not to identify compli-
cations by device name in registry presentations and
publications? These issues have been the subject of
an exchange in letters to the editors of this journal
regarding the disclosures of adverse events associat-
ed with the Stentor and the Vanguard devices.21,22
Min Tec’s Stentor device has been taken over by
Boston Scientific Corporation and superceded by
the redesigned and differently fabricated Vanguard
device. A case report of a Vanguard graft developing
fabric erosions was published in this journal in June
1999.23 The authors quoted a November 1998 let-
ter that Boston Scientific Corporation sent to “all its
customers,” noting that “late endoleaks due to holes
in the fabric covering now have been reported to the
manufacturer in six cases.” This letter also noted
that “the reported events occurred between five and
twelve months post-implant” and “only one of the
events described in this letter occurred within this
Eurostar data set.” Five of these six cases had been
discussed at a breakfast session at the Montefiore
Symposium in November 1998. A year later, at this
same symposium, the nine cases were reported to
have fabric holes, but overall data on this unique
complication have yet to be published a year and a
half after its first appearance. This may yet be found
to be simply a new and relatively low frequency form
of endoleak with this device, but this potentially
important information has not been promptly and
widely transmitted. How else can practicing sur-
geons be sure that it is safe to refer their patients
with AAAs for implantation of a particular endograft
or, if they have appropriate endovascular skills, begin
using a device that is now being marketed? Thus, the
early disclosure of possible device failures remains a
nagging issue. The Vanguard device was recently
withdrawn, but according to a company spokesman
this was not because of concern over the increasing
number of fabric holes, but because of microscopic
particles separating from the sheath, although the
latter have not had any known clinical consequence. 
Full disclosure of adverse events has subsequent-
ly been seen with the problem of late rupture of aor-
tic aneurysms “repaired” with the AneuRx device.
Three cases were reported by Politz et al24 in the
March issue of this journal, and an analysis by
Zarins, Fogarty, and White of all seven cases known
to date appears in this issue.25 Although these
reports differ somewhat in their interpretation of the
potential seriousness of this particular adverse event,
at least the vascular community has been alerted and
has the opportunity to review the details. Journals
should promptly report and fast-track articles address-
ing potentially important adverse events.
Negative trials. There is a tendency not to sub-
mit negative results for publication, and it is difficult
to get negative trials published. Just like surgeons
with poor results, companies are not likely to want
to report negative trials. However, failure to publish
negative results may result in the continuation of
harmful patient treatment, unnecessary duplication
of studies, and failure to release important scientific
data; it also subverts the ethical principle of honesty in
publishing research data. In some instances, the con-
tract between the investigator and the company may
appear to give the company the right to block pub-
lication. Recently, an investigator was obliged to step
to the podium at a major national scientific meeting
and announce that he was being prevented from
presenting the results of the study by the pharma-
ceutical company sponsor.26 Permission was with-
drawn the evening before presentation. Because of
contractual agreements with the investigators, the
industry-sponsor maintained a right to block public
disclosure. In an editorial discussing this incident,27
it was pointed out that the signed American Heart
Association abstract submission document was also
binding regarding presentation and that informed
consent documents generally include such state-
ments as “the patients and their families have agreed
to participate in an activity with risk and have the
right to be assured that the results of the study will
be transmitted to the scientific community in a time-
ly fashion.” The authors of the editorial maintained
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“that these other documents (and the informed con-
sent in particular) may also have legal standing as
contracts, and that inappropriate delays or limita-
tions in the scope of presentations may represent
breaches of these contracts.” Prevention of harm to
patients has ethical standing that would likely out-
weigh and supercede the obligations to follow the
terms of a contract requiring nondisclosure.
A company may not have included a clause to
prevent disclosure, but if it controls the pooled data,
it can effectively prevent publication. This was
observed a few years ago, when investigators from
one center, who had recruited by far the most cases
in a negative trial, finally decided to exercise their
right to present and publish their own results28 after
it became apparent that the company was not going
to have the overall trial data published. After the pre-
sentation, company officials tried unsuccessfully to
undermine that publication through telephone con-
tact with one of the former editors of this journal.
When told that it was undergoing peer review and if
accepted would be published, they then asked to
publish a rebuttal article but declined when they
found it too would have to be submitted for peer
review. After the article was published, they pub-
lished a letter to the editor29; in addition, there were
two seemingly spontaneous letters published by oth-
ers,30,31 one of whom had a contract with the study
sponsor, Curative Technologies, Inc. The primary
author’s reply32 effectively dismissed their objec-
tions, but the company officials’ response demon-
strates the extent to which a study sponsor may go
to prevent or oppose publication of negative trial
results. To not allow publication of results interferes
with the investigator’s right to report scientific data
from a trial in a timely fashion regardless of outcome
and with the patient’s right to know the outcome
since this information may modify their current or
subsequent management.
Hailey33 quotes two examples where companies
have used the court system to delay publication.
Bristol-Myers-Squib Canada, Inc, tried unsuccess-
fully to have the courts block the release of a sum-
mary document on statins prepared by the Canadian
Coordinating Office for Health Technology
Assessment. Release of the report was delayed for
almost a year. Recently, the Ontario Ministry of
Health requested that a group of experts formulate
guidelines on the use of drugs aimed at treating
ulcers and related diseases. When the panel conclud-
ed that cheaper alternatives to Losec might be equal-
ly effective, a lawyer for Astra Zeneca wrote the chair
of the committee an intimidating letter requesting
that she not finalize and distribute the guidelines
and stating if she persisted, legal action would be
instigated. The company subsequently stated that it
has never had the intention of restricting a
researcher from publishing the study results.
Delays in publication. Although the company
may encourage early publication of favorable results,
conflict between the company and the investigator
may result if the results are not favorable to the com-
pany. Last summer, it was communicated to partici-
pating investigators that enrollment had been
stopped in an almost 5-year randomized trial of
carotid stenting using the Schneider Wallstent (now
owned by Boston Scientific Corp) versus carotid
endarterectomy for carotid stenosis. More than 200
patients had been entered, and the procedural mor-
tality and neurologic morbidity were said to be
much higher for the stent group than for those
undergoing carotid endarterectomy. Inquiring
about possibly fast-tracking a report of this study,
the senior editor of this journal was informed by a
clinical research investigator coordinating the trial
for the company that “enrollment was stopped in
June [of 1999, but] we are continuing to follow the
patients and plan to do so for an indefinite period of
time. The data have not yet been presented or sub-
mitted for publication. The investigators agreed that
a publication committee should be identified and
that they would write the manuscript.” The reply
continued “the committee is just in the process of
being selected” and “there is no principal investiga-
tor for the trial.” The trial sponsors appeared to be
in no rush to present or publish the initial outcome
(ie, mortality and neurologic morbidity) of the com-
pared procedures, as is common practice for treat-
ment of carotid stenosis, yet it would seem that if the
outcomes had been reversed and in favor of carotid
stenting, their response regarding prompt presenta-
tion and publication might have been quite differ-
ent. 
In addition to a responsibility to inform the vas-
cular community, patients consenting to such a ran-
domized trial are normally assured of obtaining
prompt disclosure of the results of a trial if there is a
clear difference between groups. Investigators should
be certain that a publication committee is established
before the start of the study and that provision for
prompt publication of the results is assured in the
research contract they sign. The research contract
should specify that the company can only delay publi-
cation for a reasonable time to allow them to review the
manuscript and complete application for patent pro-
tection or submission to a regulatory body. Ordinarily,
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90 days is sufficient for these purposes, assuming the
latter contingency has been arranged for in advance.
Multiple publications. One of the problems
with multiple publications of the same longitudinal
data is that subsequent accounts may have different
starting points, ostensibly because the device itself
has undergone redesign. However, this practice
hides “learning curve” data that may be important
information for others who are going to start to use
the technique. Although it is reasonable to show the
impact that improvements in the device or the skills
of those implanting it have on the results, it is more
appropriate to present the entire experience and
then carry out subgroup analysis to provide the
reader with the full perspective. Detailed publica-
tions covering results, complications, and special
aspects of a device are clearly justified, but others, in
which essentially the same data are revisited with a
somewhat different discussion, are clearly examples
of “salami slicing,” which prevents the reader from
getting a broad perspective on the reported results.
To avoid this problem, a publications committee
should decide ahead of time how to fairly present the
data to avoid multiple publications and should resist
company pressures to broadly publish similar data.
As pointed out by Rennie,34 multiple publica-
tions from the same data set, along with the tenden-
cy to publish only positive results, bias the opinion
in the literature in favor of a device or a drug. A pro-
posed solution is to register trials before they are car-
ried out and to ensure publication of all results.35
Publication committees. The early establish-
ment of a publications committee from among the
principal investigators, a committee chaired by one
of them, is the optimum way to fairly divide up the
data emanating from a trial for publication. It should
be constituted at the outset of the study and be
made up of selected investigators, members of the
data-monitoring committee, and a representative or
two of the company. In May 1998, a paper present-
ed at the Eastern Vascular Society concerning “the
origin of perigraft flow after endograft aneurysm
repair,” based on an analysis of core laboratory data
from phase II of the EVT trial, was withdrawn from
submission for publication at the time of the meet-
ing at the insistence of a representative of EVT who
did not approve the release of the information at
that particular time, even though the submitted
abstract and final manuscript had been reviewed and
approved earlier. The purported reason for this
action was to allow prior publication of the “official”
results of the second phase of this trial being pre-
sented at the joint vascular meetings a month later.
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This short delay in submission may seem innocuous
(even though it was in violation of the society’s rules
for submission of abstracts, namely, that if accepted
for presentation, a manuscript will be submitted for
publication at the meeting); however, it demon-
strates that company representatives are making
decisions on submitted abstracts and manuscript
submissions that should be the purview of the entire
publication committee. Ironically, the major paper
on the phase II results was presented and submitted
for publication, but after peer review it was never
resubmitted.
CONCLUSIONS
Editorials of this nature run the risk of seeming
hypercritical or “holier than thou.” We realize that
most research and development personnel in indus-
try are scientists, too, and understand and respect
the investigator’s position in these research collabo-
rations. This editorial is not primarily based on per-
sonal negative experiences that may have given us a
biased view of this scene. However, the corroborat-
ed examples given have all been reported by col-
leagues, witnessed at national or regional meetings,
or have come to our attention while pursuing our
editorial duties.
We have identified some of the problems that
can occur in the complex relationship in clinical
research studies between clinical investigators and
industry representatives. Industry seems to be
exerting more control over the design, conduct,
and data analysis in trials, and the busy clinical
investigator is less able to defend his or her rights as
a research scientist. Because the aim of collaborative
clinical research with industrial sponsorship is to
develop safe and effective methods for diagnosing
and managing diseases, clinical investigators should
recognize their primary responsibility. It may well
be time to collectively look the gift horse in the
mouth and take a stand against inappropriate con-
trol of clinical trials and their data by industry.
The opinions expressed are those of the authors, but
they acknowledge the helpful discussions with Drs V. M.
Bernhard, J. L. Cronenwett, C. B. Ernst, R. T. Gregory,
N. R. Hertzter, W. C. Krupski, J. Matsamura, M. F.
McKneally, J. M. Porter, F. J. Veith, and Mr J. Hoover
during the preparation of drafts of the manuscript.
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